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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 The Roma people are considered to be one of the most marginalized groups in all of 
Europe. Despite integration policies introduced by the European Union, their status as outsiders 
has remained consistent throughout the EU’s member states. This framing of Roma as outcasts 
has a historical dimension as well. The Roma have persistently been labeled as “outsiders” 
throughout their long history in Europe. They have been characterized as nomadic wanderers of 
distant origins. They have been portrayed as threats – both to the safety of full citizens and to the 
values of the societies they inhabit. The case has been made, time and time again, that the Roma 
do not belong in Europe. But their very presence in Europe throughout this turbulent history 
makes it clear that the Roma have belonged and continue to belong in that space. They are 
insiders as much as they are outsiders. This seemingly paradoxical duality is evidence of the 
Roma’s instrumental role in a system of constructing identities in Europe. The inability to move 
past the idea of “Roma” as a homogenous group made up of un-integrable outsiders is due to the 
necessity of having an Other in order to uphold the notion of European-ness. This thesis argues 
that the Roma problematize the idea of European-ness by showing that it is a construction that 
relies on the presence of a constitutive Other.  
 The Roma’s role as Other is vital to this argument. The Other is essentially the opposite 
of the Self. If the Self is a specific social identity, then the Other is separate and different from 
that identity. The Self can only be defined in comparison with what it is not. Therefore, the Other 
is necessary for defining the Self. The process of Othering labels an individual or group as 
outsiders; it excludes them from the social category of the Self (Bullock and Trombey 1999, 
620). Since identity only has meaning when compared to something outside of itself, the Other is 
necessary for constituting identity. In the context of this thesis, the Self-Other relationship is 
3 
 
applied to the relationship between Europe and the Roma. The Roma are excluded from the 
category of “European.” The process of exclusion reinforces the meaning of “European-ness.”  
The Roma are a useful case for examining the relationship between Europe and its 
Others. There are many other groups that are Othered in Europe, such as immigrants and 
refugees. However, the Roma are a unique case because they have a longstanding role as both 
insiders and outsiders in Europe. Their marginality and Otherness can be traced historically 
through the treatment of the Roma since the 12th century (Crowe 1994, xi). But the Roma have 
also become embedded in European societies. The inherent contradiction in framing the Roma as 
outsiders when they are part of Europe shows that European-ness and Roma identity are 
constructed around the Self-Other relationship. That is to say, these identities are framed in 
certain ways in order to construct and reconstruct the notion of European-ness.  
My aim in this thesis is to examine the relationship between the notion of European-ness 
and the Roma. In Chapter 2, I analyze “European-ness” and the ways in which it is constructed. I 
conclude that European-ness is a fragile construction which relies on practices of exclusion. In 
Chapter 3, I analyze scholars’ representations of the ways in which Roma identity has been 
presented in various discourses. These include academic sources, national and supranational 
discourses, as well as studies on Roma self-identification. Examining these sources shows that 
Roma identity is presented as singular and homogenous, when it is none of these things. The 
simplistic representation of Roma identity makes it easier to juxtapose the Roma against the rest 
of Europe. In Chapter 4, I examine the securitization of the Roma in France. Securitization is a 
modern form of Othering which helps to construct the idea of European-ness. In Chapter 5, I 
present my conclusions and thoughts on the ways in which the ideas presented in this thesis may 




This thesis will examine the relationship between the ideas of Roma identity and 
European-ness. In order to do so, I use discourse analysis which is informed by scholarly 
sources. The three main sections of my thesis include examinations of the notion of European-
ness as a construction, the ways that Roma identity is presented, and the securitization of the 
Roma in Europe. I begin each section with a story pertaining to the topic of the section. The 
narratives presented in these stories will provide a concrete backdrop for the subsequent 
discourse analysis. A discourse analysis approach is the most effective way of supporting the 
argument that the Roma problematize the notion of European-ness through their position of 
perpetual insider and outsider. This thesis ultimately examines how the Roma and the European 
are understood and constructed. Therefore, an analysis of the discourse is necessary because it 
shows how the construction of various identities takes place across a variety of discourses. At 
various points, the analysis is performed by examining scholars’ representations of the different 
discourses. In these cases, the analysis is informed by an academic lens. Discourse analysis 
allows for various sites to be explored with relative specificity. The narratives presented at the 
beginning of each chapter provide concrete pictures of the theoretical arguments being made in 
each section. Therefore, this method blends the advantages of both discourse analysis and the 
case study approach. 
In Chapter 2, I unpack the notion of European-ness by examining policy discourse. 
Specifically, I look at policies that promote the exclusion of certain groups and therefore 
construct European-ness through Othering. I examine policies that deal with citizenship, mobility 
and minority rights because each of these three areas is closely tied to today’s Europe. The 
analysis of these policies shows that European states take part in exclusionary practices that 
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create boundaries between Europe and its Others. In Chapter 3, I examine the notion of Roma 
identity and the ways in which this identity is presented at the scholarly, national and supra-
national levels. I first examine the trends within the academic literature’s presentation of the 
Roma. I then analyze state and EU policies that exemplify the treatment of the Roma in Europe. 
In this chapter I also examine Roma self-identification and compare it with outsider 
identification. In order to do so, I use information from surveys of Roma populations.  
In Chapter 4, I draw on the field of security studies in order to show that the 
securitization of the Roma frames them as outsiders. I examine the public discourse of French 
officials that presented the Roma as a security threat. Specifically, I examine three speeches that 
were made by former President Nicolas Sarkozy in the summer of 2010. Security studies is an 
effective theoretical framework for this chapter because the securitization of the Roma 
effectively constructs them as Others. Examining the securitization of the Roma shows how 
certain minorities are Othered through calls to maintain order, uphold public safety and protect 




 Records show that the Roma migrated to Europe as early as the 12th century (Crowe 
1994, xi). The Roma were sold as slaves in Wallachia and Moldavia, with the first recorded 
transaction taking place in 1385 (Kenrick 2007). This practice would continue until abolition in 
1856 (Crowe 1994; Hancock 2001, 25). The Roma were routinely expelled and deported from 
various cities, regions and countries. In the 15th and 16th centuries, orders for their expulsion took 
place in Lucerne, Milan, France, Catalonia, Sweden, England and Denmark (Kenrick 2007). 
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Switzerland, England and Denmark instituted orders for Roma found in their territories to be put 
to death (Kenrick 2007). Due to these drastic practices of exclusion, many Roma migrated east 
toward Poland and Russia, which were more tolerant of their Roma populations (Radu 2009).  
 During World War II, the Roma were one of the groups marked for extermination by the 
Nazis. The systematic genocide of the Roma is known as the Porajmos. On November 26, 1935, 
a supplementary decree to the Nuremberg Laws was issued which marked the Roma as enemies 
of the state (“Sinti and Roma: Victims of the Nazi Era”). Roma were first transferred to 
internment camps and then deported to concentration camps (Fein 1979, 140-141). The number 
of victims has been estimated between 220,000 and 500,000 (United States Holocaust Memorial 
Museum b). Following the war, cases of Roma persecution continued. In Czechoslovakia, a 
policy of sterilization of Roma women was carried out in 1973. Cases of forced sterilization were 
found to take place until 2001 (Thomas 2006). The Roma have often been framed as security 
threats. This took place in Italy in 2008 and in France in 2010. In these cases, security rhetoric 
was used to justify evictions and deportations of Roma (Barbulescu 2012; Parker 2012; Sigona 
2005). 
 The Roma remain a highly marginalized and impoverished group. According to a report 
presented by the European Commission, many Roma live in substandard or segregated housing. 
In Slovakia, a study found that such segregation inhibits the Roma’s access to the labor market 
(European Commission 2010, 9). Another major issue has been segregation in education. Roma 
children are often placed in separate classrooms and schools. At times, they are moved to classes 
and schools for students with mental disabilities (European Commission 2010, 9). In a statistical 
study performed in 2009, the Fundamental Rights Agency found high levels of discrimination 
against Roma in EU member-states. According to the study, “every second Romani respondent 
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was discriminated against at least once in the previous 12 months and one in five were victims of 
racially-motivated personal crimes at least once in the previous 12 months,” (European 




 It is useful to define the terms having to do with Europe and European-ness before 
continuing with an analysis of these ideas. “Europe” is a multifaceted term, as it is a geographic, 
political and cultural signifier. In terms of geography, Europe is a continent. It is divided into 
nation-states which uphold their own separate histories and cultures. However, they are all 
connected in that they are all European. In this thesis, I approach the notion of Europe as a 
community. It is a large grouping of people and states that occupy a tangible space and that share 
intertwining histories, politics and cultures. Following in this vein, “European-ness” is the 
quality of belonging to the community of Europe. There is a sense of identity that comes with 
belonging to this community. The meaning of Europe and European-ness have changed 
countless times throughout history. Even today, these terms are fluid and changing. However, 
these ideas remain influential and consequential and should therefore be analyzed.  
 When studying contemporary notions of Europe and European-ness, the European Union 
must be addressed. “Europe” and “the EU” are not interchangeable terms. However, they are 
closely connected to one another. The EU is a political and economic union consisting of 
European nation-states. It is derived from and based in a sense of European community. The 
original European Communities (European Coal and Steel Community, European Atomic 
Energy Community, European Economic Community) were a set of international organizations 
8 
 
that were governed by the same institutions (European Union 2017). However, it has been 
argued that the EU embodies the values and principles of the European community (Bruter 2005; 
Mikkeli 1998, 209-220). The EU takes part in Europe-building projects and works to further 
integration, which show its commitment to European unity.  
 My analysis of the notion of European-ness at times relies on the EU’s representation of 
Europe and European-ness. For example, in Chapter 2, I examine policies having to do with 
citizenship, mobility and minority rights because these three areas are highly valued in EU 
discourse. The EU’s representation of European-ness is useful to this project not only because it 
is easily accessible, it is also influential. Member-states and applicant states must demonstrate 
that they adhere to the values of the EU. The EU influences ideas about what it means to be 
European. Therefore, when studying contemporary Europe, it is useful and necessary to consider 
the role of the EU.  
 
The Notion of European-ness 
 Before discussing European-ness and the ways that scholars approach this subject, it is 
first necessary to examine the idea of Europe itself and the ways in which it has changed over 
time. Scholars begin to recount the history of the idea of Europe in Ancient Greek mythology, in 
which Europa was a Phoenician princess who married the king of Crete (Delanty 1995, 17). 
Europe was often evoked in juxtaposition to the “less civilized” rest of the world, namely Africa 
and Asia (Mikkeli 1998; Delanty 1995). However, the notion of Europe was not distinct, even at 
times of relative unification. Under the Roman Empire, for example, there was a sense of Roman 
dominance, rather than a truly united Europe (Delanty 1995, 20-21; Mikkeli 1998). During the 
Middle Ages, Christian Europe was often contrasted against the Occident or Islamic outsiders. 
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Europe became a cultural idea with political consequences, rather than simply a geographical 
location (Delanty 1995, 29).  
The nature of Europe was imagined in opposition to other outside entities throughout its 
history. The Ottoman Empire was one such power. Delanty goes so far as to say that the origins 
of a European identity can be traced back to resistance to the Turks in the sixteenth century 
(Delanty 1995, 37). The position of Other would later be replaced by the “savages” of the New 
World, the Slavs of the East and internal minorities such as the Jewish population (Checkel and 
Katzenstein 2009). The first World War destabilized the common notion of Europe as a center of 
civilization. The war showed that Europe could be violently divided. The idea of “civilization” 
itself was viewed pessimistically, as the war showed that civilization could give rise to 
barbarism. But one of the biggest pushes towards greater unification and integration came with 
the formation of the European Union. This entity with political and economic influences allowed 
for the movement of people, goods, services and capital across its member-states. These 
connections were supposed to bring Europe closer together through an exchange of ideas, 
cultures, people and products (Favell 2009; Kaelble 2009; Delanty 1995, 154-157). Yet it 
remains to be seen how this has changed the notion of European-ness. This is by no means a 
comprehensive overview of the history of the idea of Europe. It does, however, show that the 
meaning of Europe was constantly changing throughout history. This thesis will be focused on 
the post-Maastricht Europe which exists in the context of the European Union. My analysis 
pertains to the ways in which European-ness is understood within this context.  
Within the literature concerning Europe, some scholars argue that a common European 
spirit is present and based on common values. Amongst proponents of this viewpoint, the 
European Union is touted as a catalyst for integration and common identification among 
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Europeans. Bruter, for example, argues that a mass European identity has emerged throughout 
EU member-states. He specifically explores the influence that the media and political 
institutions, such as the EU, have on the creation of political identities (Bruter 2005). Mikkeli 
points out that scholars generally describe a pan-European identity that is based in shared values 
– such as recognition of the importance of democracy, peace and human rights – but one that 
also allows for differences through the slogan of “unity in diversity,” (Mikkeli 1998, 209-220).  
A second trend among scholars is the idea that European identity lacks any common basis 
in Europe. Many see the “European project” of integration and a common identity as an idealistic 
notion which has very little basis for such claims. Checkel, for example, argues that the political 
projects and social processes that have shaped European identity have caused the fragmentation 
of this identity. Despite projects of “Europe-building” such as the single market, the Euro zone 
and the Schengen zone, the backlash from these programs have resulted in division within 
“European” identity (Checkel 2009). Others note that Europe as a singular entity lacks the 
common history, tradition and coherence that are attributed to national identities (Mikkeli 1998). 
Unlike the previous set of authors, these academics argue that a common European identity is 
fractured at best or completely inexistent.  
Despite the presence of competing theories about the state of a Europe-wide identity, I 
argue that the notion of European-ness is a construction. However, different writers provide 
different accounts of how it is constructed. Many turn towards otherness as a way to form a 
European identity. Mikkeli states that “identity is often produced by speaking of threats” 
(Mikkeli 1998, 226), which references the need to consolidate against common enemies, as well 
as the phenomenon of juxtaposing oneself against outsiders in order to create a sense of 
cohesion. Many academics share this main idea. Cornelius Castoriadis maintains that Otherness 
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could be the central factor contributing to the creation of a consolidated European identity. He 
calls attention to the inability of groups to constitute themselves without excluding, and 
subsequently degrading, the Other (Mikkeli 1998, 231). Similarly, Vilho Harle argues that 
Europeanism is simply another expression of dualism between the self and the Other (Mikkeli 
1998, 231). While he recounts the history of Europe, Delanty repeatedly returns to the role of the 
Other in constituting a European identity (Delanty 1995). All of these thinkers promote the idea 
of the Self-Other dichotomy underpinning the construction and re-construction of European 
identity.  
Unlike other thinkers who look for a common history of the idea of Europe, Waever 
looks to the violence of past wars and divisions as a push towards integration. The awareness of 
the violence that was a product of separation is support for remaining united and peaceful. This 
creates a “security identity,” or a unity based on opposition to the violence of division (Mikkeli 
1998). Waever’s observations are valid and can be sensed in contemporary EU discourse. 
However, the role of the Other should not be completely disregarded. Europe abounds with 
Others, and to say that it has moved past this dichotomy is certainly premature. In my work, I 
connect the notions of security and otherness in order to show that these work together in 
contemporary Europe in the process of reconstructing European-ness. I draw on the works of the 
scholars presented here in order to show that the fragile sense of European identity necessitates 
and depends on the presence of a constitutive Other.  
 
Roma Identity: A Misleading Appearance of Consolidation 
Before entering into the literature concerning the Roma, it will be useful to first examine 
some vital points of the historical background of their presence in Europe. The first mentions of 
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the Roma take place in records dating back to the 12th century. These records include census 
documents, scholarly works and letters. According to these early accounts, the Roma were 
mostly free, skilled workers who were considered “useful citizens” (Crowe 1994, xi). However, 
they often faced poor treatment in the various areas that they inhabited. In the Kingdom of 
Hungary, the Roma were associated with the Turks and deemed spies, which resulted in 
restrictions on their nomadism. In the Ottoman Empire, however, the Roma were given the 
lowest social rank. The 16th through the 18th centuries were characterized by Roma slavery, 
especially in Wallachia and Moldavia. Emancipation was followed with little access to land and 
therefore few opportunities for better quality of life. Many states have instituted policies of 
integration, such as the Magyarization policies of the 19th century (Crowe 1994).  
Although the treatment of Roma populations took on different characteristics depending 
on specific contexts, some broad trends can be distinguished. The Roma were often designated 
the lowest social standing in most societies. Those who were able to move up in the social 
hierarchy usually assimilated. Therefore, only the poorest were associated with the term “Roma” 
or “Gypsy.” The 18th and 19th centuries were characterized by a need to control and make “good 
nationals” out of the Roma. More recently, there has been a call to uphold Roma culture while 
also advocating for greater integration. Crowe notes that the main historical constant is the 
negative perception of the Roma. He notes that “such feelings [of prejudice] indicated as much 
about the societies that created these images as they did about the Roma” (Crowe 1994, 236). 
This brief overview has shown that, according to historical accounts, it would seem that the 
Roma are a singular group – one that can and has been measured through censuses, indicators 
and narratives. It is important to keep in mind, though, that indicators create the subject and that 
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definitions create boundaries around the object of a study. The goal of this thesis is to analyze the 
creation of such identities by examining the relationship between the Roma and European-ness.  
A considerable portion of the discourse surrounding the Roma is focused on Roma 
identity. Two major trends exist in this field of study. The first group of scholars study the Roma 
as a consolidated group and therefore perpetuates the notion of a singular Roma identity. The 
second group examines the very notion of Roma identity and its formation. This distinction is 
important because it marks the different ways that Roma identity is discussed and portrayed by 
academics. Within the first trend, scholars take the existence of a singular Roma identity for 
granted. They focus on other issues that pertain to the Roma without giving a clear understanding 
of who the Roma are. A portion of these scholars endeavor to present a history of the Roma 
people. David Crowe and Yaron Matras each present a history of the Roma of Europe and 
Russia. Both of these sources describe the Roma’s long histories in various parts of Europe 
(Crowe 1994; Matras 2015). Zoltan Barany follows suit by looking at the Roma presence in post-
communist societies (Barany 1994, 321-344). All of these sources endeavor to recount a history 
of the Roma in Europe. 
Other scholars focus on issues pertaining to the Roma such as Roma activism and issues 
of citizenship and statelessness. Many such authors examine grassroots development and social 
movements that are directly related to the Roma (Brown and Schafft 2000; Cemlyn et al 2014; 
Gheorghe 2013). Andrew Ryder takes on an interesting perspective by looking at participatory 
community research and the creation of knowledge through work with Roma communities 
(Ryder 2015). The academics who connect the Roma to issues of citizenship and human rights 
focus on the consistent marginalization of the Roma (Biro et al 2013; Howard-Hassmann and 
Walton-Roberts 2015; Tait 2004). Warnke has noted that, despite the recent changes in minority 
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rights, the Roma are continually marginalized (Warnke 1999). This is often manifested in the 
forced mobility of Roma people. Various case studies portray the phenomenon of displacing 
Roma people, such as the forced returns of Roma to Kosovo or airport screenings in the Czech 
Republic (Troszczynska-van Genderen 2010; Tait 2004). Although these scholars consider 
various issues that relate to the Roma, they do not question the nature of the categorization of the 
people that they examine. By failing to do so, they implicitly contribute to the unproblematic-
seeming mainstream representation of Roma identity. 
Still other scholars question the portrayal of the Roma as a singular group. These 
academics see identity as a construction. They examine the ways in which the Roma are 
classified and the effects of this classification. Some examine the differences between internal 
and external ethnic identification, concluding that ethnic identity is produced dialectically and 
that internal and external identifications are not always the same (Ahmed et al 2007; Krieg and 
Walsh 2007, 169-186). Koulish takes the examination of ethnic identification a step further in his 
analysis of Hungarian Roma, in which he concludes that categorization based on ethnicity can 
lead to injustices (Koulish 2005). Many scholars examine the process of constructing Roma 
identity. Although their analyses differ, all of these scholars consider Roma identity as a 
construction with a political dimension (Kovats and Surdu 2015, 5-18; Krieg and Walsh 2007, 
169-186; Lin 2013; Petrova 2003, 111-161). Farget examines the discourse tied to legal cases 
concerning Roma people, which results in defining their legal identity as a cohesive group. She 
argues that the outcome is a stereotype definition of being Roma which is both restrictive and 
distorted (Farget 2012, 291). This shows the ways in which states play a part in building the 
perception of Roma identity. Rovid also presents the dilemma of recognizing the Roma as a 
national minority or as a non-territorial nation (Rovid 2011, 1). Both of these scholars tackle the 
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question of normative European policy and its effects on those who are defined by it. Kovats and 
Mihai argue that Roma identity is constructed on the basis of political and expert knowledge by 
policymakers, Roma activists, international organizations and scholars. This identity is then 
attributed to groups of people who are not bound together in the traditional sense – through 
common language, religion, culture, location, or lifestyle. Kovats examines the practices that 
contribute to the construction of this identity, which include police profiling, administrative 
surveys, Romani activism, policies targeting the Roma and quantitative scientific research. The 
way that Roma identity is constructed reinforces exclusion of Roma which in turn leads to more 
policy initiatives that target Roma (Kovats and Mihai 2015, 5-18). This shows the ways in which 
discourse can impact its subject. 
 Other writers also consider the effects of a constructed Roma identity on the Roma. 
These sources examine a wide range of topics, including the securitization of the Roma, the 
framing of the Roma as a European problem and the roles of the media and public opinion. 
Owen, for example, observes the way in which the Roma population in France was considered a 
collective security threat, which justified their deportation. Owen asserts that the securitization of 
the Roma was possible due to conditionality in the EU citizenship law (Owen 475-491). 
Vermeersch examines the effects of framing the Roma as a group that should be given attention 
and for whom special policies should be enacted. This creates the idea that the Roma are a 
“European issue,” which shifts accountability away from individual states (Vermeersch 2012, 
1195-1212). The media and public opinion are also heavily analyzed within this portion of the 
discourse. Strausz looks at the representation of Roma in film and the media in Hungary (Strausz 
1-24), while Vamanu and Vamanu examine how Roma are presented in the mainstream media in 
Romania (Vamanu and Vamanu 2007). In both cases, the authors show how public opinion of 
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the Roma is formed and how the public makes sense of the Roma. All of these scholars consider 
the consequences of a discourse that takes for granted the categorization of a group of people 
who are called the “Roma.”   
 
The Roma through the Lens of Security 
 The ideas presented in the field of security studies are necessary to understanding the 
relationship between the Roma and European-ness. The practice of securitization is a modern 
form of Othering, as it excludes certain groups through the rhetoric of security. Therefore, 
security is a useful tool for exploring the relationship between Europe and the Roma. Buzan and 
Hansen are two leading academics in this field and they provide an overview of the history of 
international studies and the various issues and approaches being used in the field (Buzan and 
Hansen 2009). Hansen also portrays the application of these theories through her discourse 
analysis of the Bosnian War (Hansen 2013). An examination of the various meanings of security 
are also useful. Huysmans explores the many ways that “security” is dealt with, including the 
definition, a conceptual analysis and the thick signifier approach. The various uses of the term 
“security” complicate the use of the term and ultimately call for a deeper understanding of the 
concept (Huysmans 1998).  
 Much of the conversation concerning security is also tied to Europe and its relationship to 
migrants and minority groups. Sasse, for example, argues for a reconceptualization of the 
framing of minority and migration issues. Instead of the security framing, she advocates for a 
rights-based approach to migration and minority policies (Sasse 2005). Similarly, Galbreath and 
McEvoy argue that the existing approaches to societal security have failed to make European 
organizations effectively transformative in the field of interethnic relations (Galbreath and 
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McEvoy, 2012). Evidently, security as a major framing of minority and migration discourse is a 
popular one, yet it is also criticized by many academics in the security studies field.  
 Various authors link security studies to the Roma, especially through the concept of 
securitization. This portion of the existing conversation creates connections between migration, 
minorities and security within the analysis of the Roma in Europe. Academics who embark on 
this kind of analysis overwhelmingly note that the securitization of the Roma is linked to an 
exacerbation of their status as stateless, marginalized people. For example, van Baar argues that 
the securitization occurring throughout Europe has impeded the ability of many Roma to 
exercise their citizenship – especially in the form of their right to the freedom of movement (van 
Baar 2015). A large portion of the discussion focuses on cases in which Roma are specifically 
targeted through discursive securitization or criminalization. Many writers have examined this 
phenomenon in France, where Roma migrants were constructed as a collective societal threat and 
subsequently deported (Barbulescu 2012; Parker 2012). Costi presents a similar case occurring in 
Italy, where the representation of Roma as outsiders in the public discourse has been matched by 
anti-immigrant and anti-Roma reforms (Costi 2010).  Those who study security and the Roma 
find that the securitization of this minority group is implemented through the discourse in order 
to serve vested interests and ultimately has negative consequences for the Roma.  
The securitization of the Roma is presented as a form of Othering by some scholars in the 
security literature. In their chapter in The Discourses and Politics of Migration in Europe, 
McGarry and Drake offer a case study of French authorities’ reactions to the increase in 
migration of Roma from Romania. Roma migrants were portrayed as an ethnic Other through the 
security discourse. This portrayal justified the deportation of Roma migrants by framing them as 
a group that did not belong in France. The Roma identity was constructed by the French state as 
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a problematic ethnic group that was a security threat (McGarry and Drake 2013). McGarry and 
Drake show how security can be applied to an analysis of the portrayal of the Roma in public 
discourse. Evidently, using security studies as a theoretical framework allows for an examination 
of the Self-Other relationship between Europe and the Roma.  
 
Contribution 
 Other scholars have examined Roma identity, the notion of European-ness and the 
securitization of the Roma and other minorities. In this thesis, I bring together the ideas 
presented in these three areas in order to portray the process of constructing European-ness. 
Although this process has occurred throughout history – for as long as Europe has existed as an 
idea – I examine the ways in which it happens in contemporary Europe. I show that security is a 
rhetoric that allows for the Othering of certain groups. By showing how this process takes place, 
I make three notable contributions. First, I contribute to the conversation about constructing 
identities – specifically, European identity. I present a case which exemplifies the model for 
identity construction through Othering. Second, I call attention to the Roma’s position in Europe. 
Although the Roma are a marginalized group, I show that this marginalization is used to 
construct and uphold the notion of European-ness. In order for Europe and European-ness to 
exist as they currently do, the presence of constitutive Others such as the Roma is necessary. 
Third, my work comments on the treatment of minorities in Europe. Throughout Europe – and 
elsewhere – people are marginalized, exoticized and minoritized. They are Othered. As 
justification, it is said that they are different, foreign, less human, a threat to values and security. 
But this thesis shows that the real threat is towards a sense of identity. In the case I explore, the 
fragile sense of European identity is at stake and groups like the Roma are used to keep it intact.  
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Chapter 2: The Notion of European-ness 
The Romanian PR Campaign 
 In September of 2008, the Romanian government began a nation branding campaign 
called “Romanians in Europe.” The campaign ran in Italy and Spain through November of the 
same year. The project was part of Romania’s response to the growing negative public opinion 
concerning Romanian immigrants in other EU member-states. Romanians were largely 
associated with criminal activity, especially in Spain and Italy. Part of the issue, as identified by 
the Romanian government, was that Romanians were being confused with Roma immigrants – 
many of which were Romanian as well as Roma (Kaneva and Popescu 2014, 513). A year before 
the campaign was launched, an Italian woman was murdered in Rome. The attack was allegedly 
committed by a Romanian Roma. This highly publicized event sparked reactions from the 
Romanian government. The state was interested in portraying “real” Romanians and correcting 
the association between Romanians and Roma (Kaneva and Popescu 2014, 511). The 
“Romanians in Europe” campaign was a nation branding campaign that was meant to create a 
specific image of Romanians within Europe.  
The aim of the project was to reshape the public’s understanding of Romanians as being 
valuable and unthreatening to Spanish and Italian societies. The campaigns used print and 
television advertisements to accomplish this goal. In both formats, the advertisements presented 
immigrant Romanians living and working with Spaniards and Italians. The Romanians in the 
advertisements are portrayed as being fully integrated in their host nations. In the Italian 
television commercials, the Romanians speak fluent Italian. Both sets of advertisements present 
the Romanian immigrants’ occupations. According to these campaigns, Romanians are 
paramedics, hotel managers, entrepreneurs, gardeners, butchers, electricians and theater 
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directors. This is notable, since statistics show that between 1990 and 2006, 67% of Romanian 
immigrants in Europe worked in construction, agriculture and housekeeping (Kaneva and 
Popescu 2014, 516). The difference between the white-collar representation of Romanians in the 
advertisements and the occupational statistics shows that the campaign tried to present 
Romanians as skilled workers. The advertisements present an ideal Romanian – one that 
integrates, speaks the native language and is employed in a profession that is useful to the host 
society. This is also a Romanian who is juxtaposed against the stereotypical view of Romanian 
immigrants, which is criminal, threatening and failing to integrate into society.  
In each case, the aim is to juxtapose Romanians against the Roma with which they are 
often conflated. There is an implicit comparison between the Romanians portrayed in the 
advertisements and the Roma. Longstanding prejudices against the Roma show them as being 
thieves, criminals and burdens on the societies in which they live (Mitchell 2005, 384-387). In 
opposition to that image, the Romanians in the advertisements are portrayed as being 
hardworking, ethical members of society. Furthermore, there are no Roma featured in the 
advertisements, which implies that the Romanian Roma are not truly Romanian. According to 
the 2011 census, the population of Roma in Romania reached 621,573 people, or 3.08% of the 
total population (Institul National de Statistica 2011). Other estimates place the number as high 
as 2.5 million since many Roma are not recorded due to a lack of identification documents, while 
others declare different ethnicities for fear of discrimination (Ciobanu 2008). Evidently, the 
Roma form a substantial minority in Romania. Therefore, Romanian Roma have a place in 
Romanian society; their Romanian identity and citizenship cannot be disregarded based on their 
ethnicity. However, the erasure of the Roma from the public’s understanding of Romanians is 
one of the goals of the “Romanians in Europe” campaign.  
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It is clear that the nation branding campaign sought to change Europe’s perception of 
Romanians by presenting them as law-abiding, integrating citizens of Europe, as well as to make 
claims about Romania’s European-ness. This portrayal was based on differentiating between 
who Romanians “really” are and how they are portrayed in the media. At the outset, this 
campaign was also set up to distinguish between Romanians and the Roma – despite the fact that 
many Roma immigrants are originally from Romania. The goal of the “Romanians in Europe” 
campaign was not only to show that Romanian immigrants should be welcomed into Italy and 
Spain; it also made an argument about Romanians’ European-ness. By juxtaposing themselves 
against the exoticized and criminalized Roma, Romanians show that they are just like the Italians 
and Spaniards. They belong in Europe just as much as the Roma do not.  
 
Construction of European-ness and the Necessary Other 
 As was shown in the example of the “Romanians in Europe” campaign, identities are 
often, if not always, constructed in juxtaposition against something that is considered to be 
outside of the given identity. In the Romanian case, the Romanian government purposefully 
excluded the Roma from the Romanian identity. This choice of Othering rhetorically placed 
Romanians on equal ground with Italians and Spaniards while excluding the Roma. The 
campaign not only distinguished the differences between Romanians and Roma, it was an appeal 
on the part of Romania to be recognized as European as opposed to the Roma who are 
considered neither real Romanians nor true Europeans. This is one recent example of the Self-
Other relationship that has shaped Europe and European-ness since the concepts first arose. As 
was made clear in the literature review, the meanings of Europe and European-ness have been 
constantly shifting. However, one common pattern is the practice of defining Europe in relation 
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to what it is not. Europe was often touted as a center of civilization and therefore juxtaposed 
against the barbaric rest of the world. In this vein, many thinkers juxtaposed Europe with Africa 
and Asia (Mikkeli 1998, Delanty 1995). This relationship mirrors the Self-Other dichotomy that 
constitutes many notions of membership. As Said notes, “It is the case that no identity can ever 
exist by itself and without an array of opposites, natives, oppositions: Greeks always require 
barbarians, and Europeans Africans, Orientals, etc.,” (Said 1995, 29). The notion of European-
ness is applied to an expansive geospatial identity that includes many people who had otherwise 
been divided. The presence of the constitutive Other has been vital for the formation of the 
notion of European-ness.  
 The reliance on constitutive Others is evidence of the fragility of European identity. 
Despite European unification and integration under the EU, European-ness remains precarious 
and difficult to define. Furthermore, attempts at greater unification often have mixed results. The 
single market is one example, as some member-states reap the rewards of the common currency, 
while others are unable to compete in the unified market. Such divisions create fragmentation in 
the sense of European-ness. As Gulbernau notes, the community created by the EU “is also a 
fragile construction for it remains a community still in the making with an ambiguous sense of 
identity and within which powerful forces are at work,” (Gulbernau 2011, 31). European-ness is 
not based in the same unifying factors as other identities, such as national identity. Unlike the 
nations within it, Europe does not have a single common language, culture or religion (Kovats 
and Surdu 2015, 5-18; Petrova 2003, 111-161). Its history is marked by internal conflict. 
Therefore, it is understandable that national identity takes precedence over European identity. 
Due to the fragmentation and fragility of European identity, its construction relies heavily on a 
contrast between European-ness and its Others.  
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 Since the rise of the European Union as a major supranational institution of power, 
European-ness is often defined within the context of membership to the EU. Discussions over 
membership occur on the state level, as with the debate over the possibility of Turkey joining the 
EU. But membership is also discussed at a more localized level, as certain groups’ membership 
to and protection under the EU are called into question. These exclusions are indicative of the 
ongoing process of Othering and identity-building that create and recreate European-ness on a 
large scale. Although the meaning of “European-ness” is highly contentious, there are certain 
rights and protections that are afforded to those who are identified as members of this group. 
Currently, the influence of the EU shapes these rights and they therefore include – but are not 
limited to – citizenship, mobility and minority protection. Citizenship and the rights it affords are 
markers of membership to Europe. Therefore, exclusion to any of these rights is indicative of 
exclusions to European-ness. In the following section, I examine three cases having to do with 
mobility, minority rights and citizenship in order to show how they are used to construct 
European-ness. Each one of these cases shows an instance in which the relationship between the 
Roma and Europe was framed by Othering through exclusionary policies.  
 
Practices of Exclusion as Othering 
Citizenship 
 EU citizenship is the basis for the rights and privileges of members of the EU. Any 
impediments to the expression of such citizenship can therefore lead to a loss of rights, as well as 
a loss of status as member of the European community. Due to the consequences of statelessness, 
the international community has made certain commitments to preventing loss of citizenship. 
The 1954 Convention Relating to the Status of Stateless Persons defines statelessness and 
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provides regulations for the treatment of stateless persons. The 1954 Convention was expanded 
by the UN High Commissioner for Refugees through the Convention on the Reduction of 
Statelessness of 1961. The 1961 Convention notably states that a “Contracting State shall grant 
its nationality to a person born in its territory who would otherwise be stateless,” (Parra 2011, 
1674). This measure is meant to guarantee citizenship for all persons. Although the Roma are 
often considered a nation without a state, the 1961 Convention grants them the right to 
citizenship. All EU member-states are signatories to both the 1954 Convention and the 1961 
Convention. By signing the conventions, they express their commitment to fighting statelessness. 
In 1997, the Council of Europe adopted the European Convention on Nationality which would 
deal with all issues concerning nationality. Article 4A states that “everyone has the right to a 
nationality,” (Council of Europe 1997, 3). This sentiment is echoed in the UN’s Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights, which also states that the right to nationality is a universal right 
and that no one should be arbitrarily deprived of it, (Parra 2011, 1676). It is clear that citizenship 
and nationality are considered vital to maintaining individuals’ rights and are therefore protected 
through various conventions and policies.  
Although many Roma are citizens of EU member-states, many others remain stateless. 
Some are denied nationality due to their race or ethnicity, while others lack access to the 
administrative procedures or documents that would grant them nationality, (Parra 2011, 1668). 
An individual is automatically a citizen of the EU if she is a citizen of one of its member-states. 
This means that EU citizenship is based solely on national citizenship, which can create barriers 
to obtaining EU citizenship for those who lack a nationality. This is one of the main reasons that 
statelessness is possible within the EU. The international community views the conferral of 
nationality and national citizenship as matters of national sovereignty. Therefore, the right to 
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grant citizenship is reserved for member-states. Article 3 of the European Convention on 
Nationality states that “each State shall determine under its own law who are its nationals,” 
(Council of Europe 1997, 3). Many EU member-states base their nationality laws on the 
principles of jus sanguinis, meaning that minority ethnic and migrant groups are often rendered 
stateless (Parra 2011, 1680; Brubaker 1990). The issue of national citizenship can stand in the 
way of stateless persons accessing EU citizenship.  
Marginalized groups are prone to de facto statelessness because they lack the rights and 
protections that comes with citizenship. For example, although Hungary grants citizenship to its 
minority populations, the Hungarian Roma experience systemic discrimination which results in 
de facto statelessness. This discrimination includes state policies that allow for segregated 
education, high unemployment rates due to prejudice, and violent hate crimes perpetrated against 
the Roma (Parra 2011, 1680; Koulish 2005, 323; Warnke 1999, 335-367). In spite of the various 
conventions and treaties which are meant to prevent statelessness, many Roma are either de jure 
or de facto stateless. This is in large part due to the importance placed on state sovereignty in the 
matter of conferring and controlling nationality. By placing full control over citizenship in the 
hands of its member-states, the EU is complicit in giving member-states control over European-
ness. In other words, states choose who is considered truly European. This is highly 
consequential for groups such as the Roma who are excluded from the rights and protections that 
are granted to full citizens. Denying citizenship is an exclusionary practice that is possible due to 
the Roma’s perceived Otherness. The Roma are constructed as non-members because they are 
portrayed as outsiders. This practice also reestablishes their Otherness through the continuation 





In recent years, mobility has had a major role in building a sense of European unity. 
Since the 1957 Treaty of Rome, the European community has been closely associated with the 
four major freedoms of the EU, which are the freedom of movement of people, capital, goods 
and services. Various policies and institutions have been introduced to encourage mobility and 
facilitate greater integration between member-states. The Schengen Zone, for example, is a 
major step in reducing barriers to mobility along the lines of national borders. The EU has also 
created various Trans-European Networks, which are “transportation, energy and 
telecommunication networks meant to guarantee the flows represented by the idea of the four 
freedoms,” (van Baar 2014, 2). According to the European Commission, the mobility of citizens 
– as both consumers and laborers – is vital to an interconnected, growing European economy 
(European Commission 2015). These developments are meant to allow for greater accessibility 
and more exchanges across borders. Projects such as the Schengen Zone and the Trans-European 
Networks contribute to the rhetorical framing of the EU as a space that is highly interconnected 
and therefore easily traversable. Of course, freedom of mobility is predicated upon EU 
citizenship, meaning that all nationals of member-states are allowed to freely move within the 
EU. Therefore, just as with citizenship, freedom of movement is a marker of European-ness or 
belonging within the European community.  
Although freedom of movement is seen as a fundamental virtue of EU citizenship, the 
Roma’s mobility is often impeded. Such impediments to freedom of movement often take the 
form of deportations, declined asylum claims and denial of entry into member-states. The 
conception of Roma mobility differs from that of the Schengen Zone mobility. The Roma are 
seen as a nomadic people who are excessively mobile. Their mobility is tied to the nomadic past 
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of the Roma people – most of which are currently sedentary. The misleading representation of 
Roma mobility is used to justify limits on their mobility. Mobility within the EU’s Schengen 
Zone is supposed to allow for labor to be flexible and follow employment opportunities across 
member-states. Therefore, the Roma and other Europeans migrate for the same reasons. The 
conceptions of their mobilities are different, which allows for discrimination against the Roma.  
In 1999, Roma asylum-seekers from Slovakia tried to apply for asylum after entering 
Belgium. Belgian officials did not allow the individuals to begin the asylum procedures. Instead, 
they were transported to a detention center and subsequently deported to Slovakia (van Baar 
2014, 3). The Belgian officials violated the principle of non-refoulement of asylum-seekers by 
deporting the Roma migrants. Through their actions, they also made a statement about what 
kinds of people would be allowed mobility into the EU’s capital. In subsequent years, the 
Roma’s attempts to escape violations of their rights would be met with more impediments to 
mobility, as well as public condemnations of their attempts at mobility. According to a statement 
from Robert Fico, a Slovak politician who would later become Slovakia’s Prime Minister, the 
Roma’s “speculative requests for political asylum endangered the free movement of decent 
Central and Eastern European citizens,” (van Baar 2014, 3; Togneri 2000). A similar argument 
was made by French officials following the scandal of the 2010 deportations of Roma, which 
will be explored in Chapter 4 of this thesis. In these cases, the Roma are juxtaposed against 
“decent” European citizens who truly deserve the freedom of movement. Despite the rhetoric of 
integration and the fact that most Roma have EU citizenship, they are continually framed as 
belonging to some non-European group that should not have access to the same rights as full EU 
citizens. By portraying the Roma as “irregular” citizens, member-states can justify deportations 
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and other impediments to their freedom of movement. In doing so, they further the exclusion and 
Othering of the Roma.  
State officials are able to frame the Roma as irregular citizens due to the common 
perception that Roma are nomadic people. Ironically, the call to limit Roma mobility is made on 
the grounds that the Roma exercise excessive mobility. The nomadicization of the Roma has two 
major consequences. First, it results in the criminalization of the Roma, as they are seen as less 
easy to control and more likely to take part in illegal activities. According to a communication 
from Europol, “Bulgarian and Romanian (mostly of Roma ethnicity), Nigerian and Chinese 
groups are probably the most threatening to society as a whole. Roma organized crime groups are 
extremely mobile, making the most of their historically itinerant nature,” (van Baar 2014, 5; 
CEU 2011, 14). It is evident that the Roma are collectively associated with criminality. 
Furthermore, their mobility is directly implicated as the cause of this criminality. The 
assumptions portrayed in this excerpt show that the Roma are essentialized as criminals based on 
their supposed historic mobility.  
The second consequence of nomadicization is that it separates the Roma from any nation-
state to which they may be members. In many cases, Roma are viewed as being Roma above all 
else, meaning that their identity as Europeans or nationals of certain states is subordinated. 
Therefore, they often lack the protections of the nation-states whose citizenship they hold. 
According to a Belgian report on itinerant criminal groups,  
“Sedentary criminals are understood to be nomads, originally from the former 
Yugoslavian Republic, Romania, France or Belgium. These nomads are actually 
people without a real homeland. […] Despite the fact that a large part is settling 
down, the break between being sedentary and being mobile is not radical and 
29 
 
never final. Sometimes they strengthen their apparent sedentarisation… [but they] 
can also start moving around again suddenly,” (van Baar 2014, 4; CGBFP 2010, 
10-11).  
This report shows how the criminalization and nomadicization of groups such as the Roma 
occurs in policy discourse. The “nomads” are characterized as lacking a homeland, although 
many Roma are citizens of EU member-states. Nomadicization becomes a tool for 
discrimination. The “rootlessness” present in this rhetoric is further justification for impediments 
to their mobility. And, since mobility is a vital part of EU citizenship and European-ness, it 
essentially excludes the Roma from Europe.  
 
Minority Rights 
 The protection of minority rights is another requirement of membership to the EU. Prior 
to accession, states must prove that they meet political, economic and administrative criteria. 
Under the political criteria, a state must have “achieved stability of institutions guaranteeing 
democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities,” 
(Ibryamova 2013, 351). Therefore, the protection of minority rights is indicative that a member-
state shares the values of the European community. Compliance with EU laws on minority rights 
has often been based on the ratification of international instruments such as the European 
Convention for Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, the European 
Convention on Nationality and the European Social Charter of the Council of Europe 
(Ibryamova 201, 351). The ratification of such documents is evidence of a state’s commitment to 
protecting minority rights and its obligation to uphold European standards. At the national level, 
member-states have adopted anti-discrimination legislation, implemented programs for Roma 
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integration and ratified the Council of Europe’s 1995 Framework Convention for the Protection 
of National Minorities (Ram 2014, 4). It would appear that EU conditionality has been effective 
in influencing nation-states on the issue of minority rights and protections.  
However, once membership to the EU is attained, EU influence over minority rights 
weakens. Instead, member-states and their political elites choose to focus on the preferences of 
their constituents, (Ibryamova 2013, 350; Ram 2014, 1-2). As candidate countries become 
member-states, their newly-adopted minority policies coexist with exclusionary policies and 
practices. Among others, these exclusionary practices include discrimination in housing and 
employment, segregation in education, forced evictions, limited participation of minorities in 
political processes, as well as the discriminatory rhetoric of political elites and the media (Ram 
2014, 2). These forms of exclusion are especially relevant for minorities with limited political 
representation, such as the Roma (Ibryamova 2013, 351). In the area of education, the Roma are 
often placed in either segregated classes or schools. In the Czech Republic, Roma children are 
placed into schools for the mentally disabled. In Bulgaria, Hungary and Slovakia, Roma are 
disproportionately placed in separate schools or segregated classes (Ram 2014, 11). According to 
census data, about 12% of Roma in Bulgaria are illiterate, in comparison with 0.5% of ethnic 
Bulgarians (Ibryamova 2013, 357). Evidently, the commitment to minority rights stated through 
EU conditionality is problematized by the treatment of the Roma in the area of education. 
Another important area is the political participation of minority groups. Many member-
states guarantee Roma representation in their Parliaments. However, few Roma are actually 
elected to these positions (Ram 2014, 12). In Romania, Roma representation in parliament is 
strikingly low, as Roma-affiliated parties regularly fail to meet the electoral threshold. In the 
period between 1990 and 2007, Roma have only held five seats in the Romanian Parliament 
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(Ibryamova 2013, 362). In Bulgaria, the Roma face similar issues of representation. Between 
1990 and 2009, the Roma population was represented by only 10 seats in the parliament 
(Ibryamova 2013, 362). In both cases, it is evident that Roma political representation is low. 
Hungary has adopted a system of minority self-government (MSG), which is meant to “represent 
Roma interests and to establish Roma cultural autonomy,” (Koulish 2005, 317). However, the 
MSG system has proven to be largely focused on producing cultural autonomy, rather than social 
and political inclusion. Roma issues are relegated to the MSG’s, instead of being addressed by 
the state. The responsibility for Roma issues is shifted from the state to the Roma themselves. 
Roma attempting to access services from municipal governments are redirected to the MSG, 
which may not offer such services due to lack of resources and funds (Koulish 2005, 321-322; 
Ram 2014, 13). Due to the lack of viable forms of representation, it cannot be said that the Roma 
receive full protection of their rights as minorities. Many of the efforts to increase Roma 
participation appear to be symbolic, as they have failed to increase the political participation of 
the Roma. Without substantial political representation or participation, other minority rights and 
concerns are unlikely to be addressed. The Roma are essentially excluded from the protections 
offered to other European minorities. These practices of exclusion frame them as outsiders who 
do not merit the same protections and rights as other Europeans.  
 
Conclusions 
The construction of any identity relies upon constitutive Others against which the identity 
is framed. This Self-Other relationship is reproduced in the construction of European-ness 
through its relationship with certain minorities and outsider groups. In order to continually re-
establish this relationship, Others are excluded from the rights and privileges that are associated 
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with membership in the European community. In this section, I have explored three cases in 
which rights that are fundamental to EU membership are not granted to the Roma. The Roma’s 
rights of citizenship, mobility and the protection of their rights as minorities are all impeded in 
various cases throughout Europe. Since the Roma are excluded from the rights of Europeans, 
they are framed as being non-European or belonging lower in the hierarchy of European-ness. 
The Othering of the Roma is also based on a history of anti-Roma prejudice, which shows that 
this relationship is continually created and re-created in order to uphold an otherwise fragile 





Chapter 3: Roma Identity: Misleading Appearance of a Singular Identity 
The Declaration of a Roma Identity 
 In the summer of 2000, the fifth World Romani Congress was held in the Czech 
Republic. Delegates and members of the International Romani Union gathered to discuss issues 
relating to the Roma community (Goodwin, 2004). The most notable result of the fifth World 
Romani Congress was the production of the Declaration of a Roma Nation. This document calls 
for the recognition of the Roma Nation while also making it clear that this nation does not seek 
statehood (International Romani Union, 2001). The declaration raised many questions in the 
international community, such as how a non-territorial nation could attain equal status with other 
nations and how such a nation would function. The representatives of the International Romani 
Union emphasized that the Roma nation was seeking representation at the United Nations and 
the European Union (International Romani Union, 2001). However, the declaration presents few 
details about how such representation would function. The nature of membership to the Roma 
nation must first be established, as it is unclear who such a nation represents. The document also 
lacks information about how representatives would communicate with the Roma population and 
voice their concerns. Although the declaration claims to unify the Roma community, there are 
many logistical questions about such a nation without a state.  
The Declaration of a Roma Nation seemed to be evidence of unity within the global 
Roma community. By demanding international recognition, the Roma assert their ability to 
determine their own future and shape their relationships to other groups. In order to make the 
claim of nationhood, the Roma community should exhibit unifying factors. The declaration 
implies that the Roma not only share certain common characteristics, they also possess a 
common Roma identity. The document evokes a shared tradition, culture, origin, language and 
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history of persecution as proof of the nation (International Romani Union, 2001). However, 
many have claimed that the Roma lack the unifying traits which often characterize nations, such 
as common language, culture, religion, or even geographic location (Kovats and Surdu 2015, 5-
18; Petrova 2003, 111-161). Others have noted that the Roma are made up of many subgroups, 
making true unity unlikely (Ahmed et al 2007, 231-255; Szuhay 2005, 226-236). Although the 
Declaration of a Roma Nation seems to bring up more questions than it answers, it is an example 
of a concerted effort to claim a common Roma identity. This chapter will focus on the 
construction of Roma identity during the 1990’s and early 2000’s and the issues that arise as 
Roma identity is represented in various discourses.  
 
Introduction 
 As stated above, this chapter will be dedicated to an examination of the ways in which 
the Roma are presented in various discourses. It will begin with an account of the scholarly 
writings that have to do with Roma identity. These include works that present a view of the 
Roma as homogenous, as well as those that question this widely-accepted perception. In the 
second section, I will examine the various national and supranational discourses that present the 
Roma to the general population through the vantage point of the state and the EU. In order to 
examine the national discourse, I will turn to the rhetoric of state officials and political elites. I 
will also examine the discourse presented by the EU in order to show how the Roma are 
presented at the supranational level. This will include an assessment of the policies and political 
discourse about the “Roma issue.” In the third section, I will examine the implications of Roma 
self-identification in order to contrast between outsider and insider discourse concerning the 
Roma. Self-identification is important to consider because, although it is one of the least 
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publicized forms of Roma-related discourse, it is a direct reflection of the ways in which Roma 
view their own identity. It also problematizes the simplified view of the Roma presented in many 
other forms of discourse by calling attention to the diversity within the Roma community and the 
complexities inherent in the process of hailing identities.   
 This chapter will compare the different representations of Roma identity. It will remark 
on the stark differences that occur depending on the context in which a specific form of rhetoric 
is being used. In the most popular or visible discourses – and even in many scholarly works – the 
Roma are presented as having a singular, coherent identity. Moreover, this identity is considered 
to be common knowledge and self-explanatory, despite there being no actual definition of Roma 
identity in most cases. Scholarly studies and polls of Roma self-identification show that the 
Roma are a very diverse group with many subgroups. These studies show that outsider 
perceptions of the Roma rarely correspond with insider identification. All of these findings 
support the argument that the Roma are presented as a singular group with a clearly defined 
identity even though a more precise picture shows that the politics of Roma identity are much 
more complex. Discourse plays a major role in the understanding of Roma identity.  
 
Representations of the Roma in Various Discourses 
Scholarly Discourses 
 In this section I will examine academic sources as a form of discourse. It is understood 
that scholarly discourse shapes the object of its study and is therefore consequential and worth 
examining. The body of academic literature that focuses on the Roma is extensive and will 
therefore not be covered in its entirety in this study. Instead, this section will be an examination 
of the scholarly works that deal with the topic of Roma identity, both indirectly and explicitly. 
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This is itself a large pool of literature. In order to facilitate the analysis, it will be divided into 
subsections which are indicative of the various strains present within the larger literature. The 
first group will include academic works that assume the unproblematic presence of a coherent 
Roma identity. These include works that study the Roma ethnographically, as well as those that 
presume to make arguments about what it means to be Roma. This section will show that there is 
a large body of academic literature that presents the Roma as a singular group with a more 
coherent identity. The second group is made up of works from scholars who look at the idea of 
Roma identity more critically. These thinkers question the simplistic representation of Roma 
identity that is often taken for granted. These works will provide the foundation for the argument 
that Roma identity is – as are all other identities – a construction that is dialectically created 
through everyday processes as well as through discourse.  
 Within the scholarly literature concerned with the Roma, many works focus on the 
construction of a history of the Roma. Most of these sources focus on the Roma of Eastern 
Europe, as most of Europe’s Roma population has been concentrated in that geographical area. 
Zoltan Barany explores the socio-political and economic situation of the Roma in post-
communist countries (Barany 1994, 321-344). Although he discusses the marginality and 
identity of Eastern European Roma, Barany lacks specificity in his analysis and generalizes his 
observations to reflect the experiences of all Eastern European Roma. Ethnographic works offer 
a similar dilemma. Szuhay notes that many ethnographic works fail to capture the diversity 
among the Roma. He states that many of these accounts study only one group of Roma – in most 
cases it is the Vlach Roma, which are seen as the most traditional Roma – and extend their 
findings to encompass all Roma subgroups. Studies undertaken by Gyorgy Rostas-Farkas, Ervin 
Karsai and Pal Farkas generalize observations on the Vlach Roma to the Roma as a whole 
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(Szuhay 2005, 226-236). These works fail to present the diversity of the Roma and thus present a 
distorted picture of the Roma. By using the categorization of “Roma” without specificity, these 
scholars perpetuate the notion that Roma identity is neatly consolidated. However, there are 
sources that lay the groundwork for a reconceptualization of Roma identity as a multifaceted 
one.  
 Various scholars question the simplistic representation of Roma identity. These 
academics are critical of the generalization of Roma-ness. They explore the ways in which 
members of the Roma community depart from such a straightforward categorization. They also 
examine the effects that such a simplified representation of identity has on the Roma. Although 
some historical accounts are generalizing, others demonstrate the diversity of this group. David 
Crowe presents a history of the Roma of eastern Europe and Russia, in which he examines 
groups of Roma within the contexts of six nations (Crowe 1994). Crowe portrays the ways in 
which the histories of the Roma interacted with the histories of the nation-states that they 
inhabited. He also shows that each of these contexts had an impact on the Roma that inhabited 
that specific space. Similarly, Yaron Matras begins his history by stating that all Roma stem 
from a common point of origin which separated into groups with notable differences as the 
Roma became widely dispersed throughout Europe. Matras focuses on the organization of Roma 
society, its common language, history and traditions. However, he also makes note of the 
differences among Roma subgroups (Matras 2015). Although no work can provide a complete 
account of every Roma experience, scholarly works that contextualize different subgroups create 
a more complex picture of the Roma.  
 Certain scholars focus explicitly on the construction of Roma identity and its 
consequences. These scholars examine the ways in which the common conception of Roma 
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identity is produced, as well as the effects of this construction on the Roma. Gheorghe argues 
that Roma identity is at least partially shaped through discourse. He shows that the language of 
Roma-centered discourse has often held back the Roma in both activism and policy-discourse 
(Gheorghe 2013). By examining the discourse around the Roma issue, Gheorghe shows that the 
issue is shaped by the way it is presented and discussed. Kovats and Surdu argue that Roma 
identity is constructed on the basis of political and expert knowledge by policymakers, Roma 
activists, international organizations and policymakers. This identity is then attributed to groups 
of people who are not bound together in the traditional sense, which would be through attributes 
such as common language, culture, religion, geographical location, or lifestyle. Instead, identity 
is constructed through social processes (Kovats and Surdu 2015, 5-18). The treatment of the 
Roma by the reigning political elite is one example. Census information and police profiling that 
specifically target people identified as Roma both define the Roma in relation to the state. 
Similarly, policies that target the Roma – such as integration measures – also define the Roma in 
specific ways. Scholarly works have a similar effect. Surveys and quantitative scientific research 
are cited as forms of discourse that shape Roma identity and the ways in which it is understood 
(Kovats and Surdu 2015, 5-18). The works of Gheorghe and Kovats and Surdu show that 
academic literature is effective in shaping Roma identity. They also show that these 
representations are consequential, as they affect the ways that the Roma are treated.  
 Some scholars problematize the idea of identity and the processes that go into 
constructing it. Lin notes that identity can be used in the reproduction of social inequality since 
the rhetoric of identity can often essentialize groups (Lin 2013). This phenomenon can be seen 
through the governance of Roma peoples in Italy. Recent political discourse frames the “Gypsy 
problem” in Italy in terms of public security and emergency. Due to this framing, governance of 
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the Roma has shifted from the local to the central government. This shift in responsibility is 
accompanied by a change in tactics; the Roma question changes from a social policy issue to an 
issue of policing (Sigona 2011, 590-606). This demonstrates the difficulties of minority 
identification, as it can be framed in ways that are not beneficial to the minority group. Mitchell 
notes that present-day Roma are often identified based on social aspects such as poverty, 
unemployment and degraded living conditions (Mitchell 2005, 383-395). Many ethnographic 
studies use these socio-economic attributes in order to identify Roma groups. Of course, these 
Roma are the most visible. Those who are more integrated or affluent are less visible and are 
rarely included in studies of the Roma. This unequal representation can contribute to a negative 
and skewed view of the Roma.  
 An analysis of the scholarly work concerning Roma identity and representation shows 
that scholars have both generalized Roma identity and complicated it. However, an examination 
of these writings also makes it clear that Roma identity is a construction. Roma identity can be 
presented in such a variety of ways because it is constantly created and re-created through 
discourse. These various representations are reflections of the Roma being observed. However, 
they also show the intellectual commitments of the observers. Furthermore, all of these works 
show that the representation of the Roma as a coherent unit with a common and easily-
identifiable identity is overly simplistic. The simplistic view of Roma identity is perpetuated by 
some scholars, although many more recent works are concerned with problematizing this 
simplistic picture. Roma identity does not come out of shared language, traditions, or ties to a 





National and Supranational Discourses 
 State and EU discourses construct the Roma as a group that faces regular exclusion. 
Traditionally, state policies concerning the Roma have a history of being discriminatory. This 
can be shown through three examples: the case of the Berlusconi government’s security package, 
the screening of Roma by UK immigration officials and the Hungarian system of segregated 
schooling. In May of 2008, the newly elected Berlusconi government passed the ‘Nomads State 
of Emergency,’ a decree which granted the prefects of Rome, Milan and Naples allowances to 
carry out “the monitoring of formal and informal camps, identification and census of the people, 
including minors, who are present there, the expulsion and removal of persons with irregular 
status, and measures aimed at clearing ‘camps for nomads’ and evicting their inhabitants,” 
(Aradau et al 2013, 138-139). The security package on immigration contained a law maintaining 
that EU citizens could enter and reside in Italy for three months. After this period, migrants 
would have to prove that they were financially secure, possessed health insurance and that they 
lived in accordance with hygiene requirements. Failing to provide evidence of these 
requirements would result in those individuals being removed on the grounds of public and 
social security (Aradau et al 2013, 139). This security package greatly affected Italy’s Roma 
population, especially those living in camps. The ‘Nomads State of Emergency’ perpetuated the 
discursive framing of the Roma as both nomads and unhygienic welfare burdens. Under EU law, 
limits to freedom of movement can only be applied on an individual basis; such measures are not 
supposed to apply collectively to whole groups. However, the discourse of the Berlusconi 
security package demonstrates how the political rhetoric regarding the Roma in Italy resulted in 
collective discrimination and subsequent restrictions of mobility.  
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Another case of collective discrimination concerning mobility occurred in an airport in 
Prague in 2004. Screening arrangements carried out by British immigration officials were meant 
to “pre-clear” passengers before they boarded flights to the UK. The system allowed for Roma to 
be “treated with more suspicion and subjected to more intensive questioning under the pre-
clearance arrangements,” (Tait 2004). The House of Lords ruled that the screening arrangements 
were systematically discriminatory and therefore unlawful. The Home Office of the UK, the 
office responsible for implementing the screening procedures, expressed that it was “committed 
to enforcing robust immigration controls, implemented fairly and consistently,” in a non-
discriminatory manner (Tait 2004). However, further examination of the policy show that it 
allowed for the collective discrimination of Roma migrants.  
 The systematic discrimination of the Roma routinely takes place in national education. In 
Hungary, school segregation is a major issue for Roma populations. Oftentimes, education 
officials diagnose Roma children with “light mental retardation” and send them to special 
remedial schools. Roma children are also often segregated into special education classrooms 
even if they attend a mixed school. The result of both of these kinds of segregation is lower 
education standards for Roma students (Greenberg 2010, 936). Although special funds are 
committed to Roma education, these funds are often deposited into general municipal expense 
accounts by local administrations. Meanwhile, Roma students remain in segregated or special-
education classrooms. Koulish notes that “affirmative action policies like minority rights offer 
indignities and humiliations, promises of separated classes rather than textbooks, pencils and 
quality instruction,” (Koulish 2005, 323). Evidently, policy discourse at both the national and 
local levels allows for collective discrimination against the Roma.  
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 The policies put in place on the national and supranational levels are inclusionary in 
language but exclusionary in practice. This has the effect of further marginalizing the Roma. At 
the level of the EU, representatives often discuss the inclusion of the Roma. Every member-state 
must have a national strategy for Roma integration, as mandated by the EU. Recent years have 
seen the convergence of many Central and Eastern European member-states’ policies on 
minority protection. This is in part due to EU accession requirements and pressure from the EU 
following accession. The result of such pressure has been the increase in anti-discrimination 
legislation, the ratification of the Framework Convention for the Protection of National 
Minorities (FCNM) and integration programs targeting the Roma. All current member-states 
have ratified the FCNM and most include minority rights protections in their constitutions and 
legislation. Government funding is allocated towards the preservation of Roma culture and 
projects that work to secure education, housing, health and employment for the Roma. The EU 
has also mandated that all member-states adopt anti-discrimination legislation under the EU 
Racial Equality Directive (Directive 2000/43/EC). Each EU member-state also has its own 
National Roma Integration Strategy (Ram 2014, 4-7). It is evident that the pressure exerted by 
the EU has been effective in creating awareness of Roma issues and in producing legislation and 
policies directed towards these issues.  
 However well-intentioned, the policies that directly target the Roma for integration frame 
the Roma as a group that is in need of special attention. The policy initiatives and integration 
measures emphasize their status as a marginalized group. This may cause governments to adopt 
policies directed at helping the Roma. However, framing the Roma as a European issue can 
minimize the responsibility of member-states in addressing the issue. It also frames the Roma as 
outsiders to the countries in which they reside. The push to Europeanize the Roma issue has been 
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used by nationalist politicians and those with anti-Roma agendas to further marginalize their 
Roma populations. Vermeersch notes that these politicians “exclude [the Roma] symbolically 
from their own national space and frame them […] as ‘outsiders’ and ‘cultural deviants,’” 
(Vermeersch 2012, 1195). Political actors use the framing of the Roma as a group in need of 
special treatment to further their arguments that the Roma are a burden to the state. Although the 
Roma have become a European issue, this has often led to further exclusion.  
 The national and supranational policies concerning Roma inclusion are often undermined 
by the discriminatory rhetoric of public officials. Many politicians are known for their public 
anti-Roma remarks. Zsolt Bayer, co-founder of the Fidesz party in Hungary, recently stated that 
“a significant portion of the Gypsies are unfit for coexistence, not fit to live among human 
beings. These people are animals and behave like animals... These animals should not exist. No 
way. This must be solved, immediately and in any way possible” (ERRC 2015). Many members 
of the extreme right party Jobbik are also known for their anti-Roma rhetoric. In the Czech 
Republic, anti-Roma discourse is common in both national and local discourse. According to a 
Czech politician, racist rhetoric is “used as a mobilisation tool wherever there is a receptive 
audience,” (Ram 2014, 9). In Romania, anti-Roma sentiment is evident in the rhetoric of top 
political officials. For example, former prime minister Victor Ponta compared Roma to monkeys 
in a zoo. Former president Basescu previously stated that “very few [Roma] want to work” and 
that “many of them traditionally live off what they steal,” (Ram 2014, 9). Although states are 
influenced by the pressure of the EU, underlying intolerance remains unchanged. This is 
evidenced by the numerous anti-Roma remarks of officials at both local and national levels.  
 Although all EU member-states express their commitment to Roma integration at the 
supranational level, national policy is often exclusionary in nature. Furthermore, the EU fails to 
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hold its member-states accountable for such transgressions. Despite the adoption of various 
policies geared towards minority rights, barriers to true Roma inclusion continue to exist. As one 
advisor to the Romanian Prime Minister has stated, Romania has a Roma Strategy, “but only 
because Brussels demanded it. It is just a paper,” (Ram 2014, 8). This statement shows the 
image- and compliance-oriented nature of member-states’ Roma policies. Outwardly, states 
project their self-image as complying to EU policies and maintaining the same values as the 
European community. Inwardly, however, policies and rhetoric show much less progress on 
Roma issues. In Hungary’s constitution, adopted in 2011, removed any explicit mention of 
“minorities.” Only outside nationals are acknowledged by Act 179 of 2011 on the Rights of 
Nationalities, which replaced the 1993 Minority Rights Act (Dobos 2016, 13). The change was 
met with criticism from the EU, the Council of Europe and the Organization for Security and Co-
operation in Europe. However, the changes to Hungary’s constitution remain. This shows that 
policies at the national level continue to be discriminatory and that international pressure fails to 
produce sustained change.  
Even programs expressly dedicated to Roma inclusion have exclusionary policies. 
France’s National Strategy for Roma Integration is meant to help implement projects that can 
catalyze the integration of the Roma population into French society. Both the EU and the French 
government allocate funding for National Strategy programs. According to a European 
Commission report, €4 million are annually allocated to local authorities in charge of 
implementing the annual circular of 2012 which called for evictions from illegal settlements 
(European Commission 2014, 2). The main goals are preparing for evictions of Roma persons 
from illegal settlements and camps, data collection and monitoring of such illegal settlements, 
using the European Regional Development Fund to build housing solutions, as well as 
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allocations of national budget funds to halting sites. The preoccupation with eviction contradicts 
the main goal of integration, as housing is a necessary component of inclusion. Stable housing is 
necessary in order to allow for improvement in education and employment. The goal is evidently 
not Roma inclusion and betterment, but maintaining reputations and relationships with the 
international community. Ultimately, these national programs allow for the nation to portray 
itself as a member of a European community that values certain ideals. But the maintenance of 
this identity is seen as more important that upholding the actual ideals.  
 As this examination of national and supranational discourse has shown, the discourse at 
the state and EU levels reproduces the exclusion of the Roma. The discourse presents the Roma 
as a group in need of special attention. Integration programs and policies are put into place in 
order to deal with the low education, high unemployment and housing issues that are correlated 
with the Roma. However, at the level of national discourse, the Roma are further excluded. 
Integration policies are comprised of exclusionary measures, such as evictions. Political elites 
contribute to the prejudice against the Roma through their discriminatory comments. This 




 Thus far, I have examined the scholarly and policy discourses that create representations 
of Roma identity. But in order for this to be a holistic account of the various representations of 
Roma identity, an analysis of Roma self-identification must be included. The Roma are often 
presented as a homogenous group with clearly identifiable common traits in many of the 
discourses previously discussed. However, a study of Roma self-identification shows that the 
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Roma are a heterogeneous group that is not easily defined. Various groups are often identified as 
Roma by outsiders, although they do not self-identify as such. Furthermore, there is a misconnect 
between outsider identification of Roma and insider identification. All of this shows that Roma 
identity and perception of this identity are highly contested.  
 Although the Roma are often presented as a homogenous group, Roma self-identification 
complicates this overly-simplistic narrative. There are numerous groups that are externally 
identified as Roma but do not consider themselves ethnically Roma. For example, Petrova notes 
that these groups include “the Jevgjit in Albania; the Ashlkalija and Egyptians in Kosovo and 
Macedonia; the Travelers in Britain and Ireland; and the Rudari and Beyashi in Hungary, 
Romania, and other countries,” as well as the Sinti, (Petrova 2003, 112). Evidently, the idea that 
the Roma are a homogenous group is a problematic assumption. Certain groups across Europe 
are constantly mislabeled as Roma. This shows that there is a large-scale misunderstanding of 
Roma identity and the characteristics of membership to this group. But there is also a lack of 
understanding when it comes to the nature of Roma identity. Krieg and Walsh note the difference 
between how the Hungarian Roma self-identify as opposed to the majority population’s view of 
them. Within Roma communities, Roma view themselves as a “heterogeneous, sociocultural 
unit,” although they are often portrayed and viewed as a homogenous group, seen through 
stereotypes and negative bias (Krieg and Walsh 2007, 169). Roma identity is seen as a simplistic 
characteristic which is applicable to a large group of people. This in turn erases the complexities 
inherent in Roma identity. The signifier “Roma” corresponds to certain socio-cultural 
characteristics in the majority population’s imaginations. This makes it easy to identify many 
groups as being Roma, despite a lack of self-identification. There is a fundamental disconnect 
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between the way that Roma view their own identity and the ways in which they are seen by 
outside observers.  
 Studies of Roma self- and outsider-identification have shown that insider and outsider 
identification rarely match up. According to Kosa and Adany, there are three constructs for 
minority status which correspond with three forms of outsider and insider identification, and 
which can be applied to the Roma case. The first is the internal racial or ethnic identity, which is 
the individual’s belief about his or her own identification. This may or may not correspond to 
expressed identity, which is the identity that is conveyed by the speech and actions of the 
individual. The third form is external identity, or the observer’s belief about an individual’s 
identity, (Kosa and Adany 2007, 291). As this explanation makes clear, there are a variety of 
ways in which identity is interpreted. Various studies have been undertaken in an effort to 
explore the ways in which Roma are identified, both internally and externally. Both Ahmed et al 
and Koulish undertake such studies specifically focusing on Roma in Hungary. In a study 
performed by Ahmed et al, individuals were interviewed and subsequently labeled as either 
Roma or non-Roma based on the interview. The study found that interviewer classification does 
not match up with self-identification. According to the findings, 62% of those who did not 
identify as Roma were classified as such. Furthermore, 16% of self-identified Roma said that 
they were ethnically misidentified (Ahmed et al 2007, 243). The study found that interviewers 
used the self-identification of insiders, as well as social markers, to impute ethnicity. Interviewer 
classifications did not always match up with self-identification. Those who informed the 
interviewer that they self-identified as Roma were more likely to be identified as such. However, 
the results show that individuals who did not self-identify as Roma could still be classified as 
Roma. The interviewer identification was also heavily influenced by factors such as ethnic, 
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economic and demographic markers. The authors concluded that, although the Roma are 
composed of various groups, they are racialized because perceived social and cultural differences 
are viewed in biological or physical terms (Ahmed et al 2007, 243). The study shows that 
individuals label others as “Roma” due to ethnic and social markers, despite a possible lack of 
self-identification as Roma.  
 A study performed by Koulish shows similar results. The study was carried out by first 
contacting local individuals and determining whether or not they were Roma. Individuals 
identified as Roma by interviewers were selected to be respondents in the survey. The group 
included non-self-identified Roma who expressed that they did not self-identify as Roma but 
were classified as such by an interviewer. The assessments of Roma ethnicity were made “on the 
basis of the interviewee’s colour, language, dress, way of life and family name,” (Koulish 2007, 
316). According to the survey, “a typical Roma is female, under 40, lives rurally, speaks Magyar 
and is Roman Catholic. Further, she is undereducated and was economically worse off in 2000 
than in 1988,” (Koulish 2007, 316). Similarly to the study performed by Ahmed et al, this survey 
shows that external identifications of Roma differ from internal identifications. It also shows that 
classification of individuals as Roma is not wholly dependent on the individual’s self-
identification as Roma. Interviewer’s decisions were primarily based on physical characteristics 
and social traits of those being interviewed. Even when internal identification is explicitly 
expressed, it can differ from external identity. Social and physical markers are just as influential 
as expressed identification – if not more so.  
 The studies analyzed above show that misconceptions about Roma membership are 
common. They also point towards an overall trend of viewing Roma identity as a social category, 
as opposed to a cultural one. In the study performed by Ahmed et al, individuals were likely to 
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be classified based on ethnic, economic and demographic markers. Common characteristics of 
those identified as Roma include living in areas perceived as Roma neighborhoods, having a low 
income and low socio-economic status, living in large households and being less educated 
(Ahmed et al 2007, 243). Interviewers were heavily influenced by ethnic and demographic 
markers, showing that the social and cultural differences commonly perceived in Roma are 
viewed in biological or physical terms. The markers used for external classifications of Roma 
identity are social markers that are perceived as being inherent to the Roma. This trend further 
complicates the question of Roma identity.  
 
Conclusions 
Throughout this examination of Roma self- and outsider-identification, several 
conclusions have been made. In the major discourses, the Roma are often generalized as one 
homogenous group. However, they lack the homogeneity that is often ascribed to them. 
Furthermore, Roma internal identification is not synonymous with external identification; these 
two forms of identification have been shown to vary through two studies. Evidently, the Roma 
view themselves differently from the ways in which outsiders see them. An account of external 
classifications has shown that the Roma are generally identified by social characteristics. This is 
a manifestation of the idea that the Roma are inherently characterized by certain social markers 
such as a lack of education or low socio-economic status. Roma identity is constructed from both 
the outside and the inside. It is highly influenced by the dialectical relationship inherent in the 





Chapter 4: The Roma through the Lens of Security 
Deportations of the Roma from France 
 On July 16, 2010, 22-year old Luigi Duquenet was shot and killed by French police at a 
police roadblock. Various reports surfaced surrounding the circumstances of his death. 
According to the police, Duquenet was a suspect in a robbery and failed to stop at a police 
roadblock when asked. Other reports claim that the car in which he was riding had charged a 
police roadblock and then hit an officer. Duquenet’s family, on the other hand, claims that he 
was afraid of being stopped by the police because he did not have a valid driver’s license. 
Despite the ambiguity surrounding the circumstances of Duquenet’s death, it became known as 
the first in a chain of events that lead to the expulsion of thousands of Roma from France. In the 
days following Duquenet’s death, rioting took place in Saint-Aignan and Grenoble, resulting in 
clashes between travellers (gens du voyage) and the police. These violent events were highly 
publicized in the French media. On July 30, President Sarkozy gave a speech in Grenoble in 
response to the demonstrations. He stated that the rioting was indicative of “the problems caused 
by the behavior of some Travellers and Roma,” (Davies 2010). Sarkozy denounced the 
demonstrations in Saint-Aignan and Grenoble, while underlining that these events caused 
destruction and endangered police lives. He then took the matter farther, by calling attention to 
the 539 Roma camps in France. The president stated that he could not accept the “wild squatting 
and camping of the Roma” and he promised that half of them would be removed within three 
months, (Fichtner 2010).  
 By correlating the riots with the Roma, French officials called for the public to equate 
violent outbursts with the Roma. This correlation had real consequences for the Roma 
communities in France. Sarkozy’s claims of dismantling Roma camps gained credibility as 
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French police began dismantling numerous settlements. The inhabitants of these camps – 
primarily Bulgarian and Romanian Roma – were either evicted or expelled from the country. 
Estimates show that approximately 1,000 of these Roma were deported between July and 
September of 2010 (Severance 2010). France’s national strategy for Roma integration allocates 
funds for the development of alternative housing options and emphasizes evictions as a route to 
better housing (European Commission 2014, 1-15). However, the deportations of Roma 
contradict the French claims of prioritizing integration. The evictions were justified as being 
“voluntary” because of a financial incentive. Each returnee was given €300 from the French 
Office of Immigration and Integration, as well as an additional €100 per child (European Roma 
Rights Center 2012, 1-2; Martin 2013, 1-2).  
 French officials offered other justifications for their treatment of the Roma migrants. The 
correlation between the violent riots and Roma populations implied the culpability of the entire 
Roma population in violence, criminal activity and general disruptions in French society. 
According to a statement from President Sarkozy’s office, camps were identified as a source of 
“illegal trafficking, appalling living standards, exploitation of children through forced begging, 
prostitution, and crime,” (Severance 2010). Thus, Roma camps and Roma individuals were cast 
as security risks as well as centers of crime.  
 One early winter morning, police came to a Roma camp to dismantle the settlement. The 
fifteen Roma families who had been living in the woods of Champs-sur-Marne outside of Paris 
were awoken by the police before dawn. They were given half an hour to collect their belongings 
and leave the premises. The group that had come to evict them was made up of about 100 riot 
police who then proceeded to dismantle the encampment. Excavator machines were brought in to 
assist in the demolition. Once the camp had been razed to the ground, large holes were dug in the 
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ground to discourage others from settling in the area. Meanwhile, the evicted Roma moved on 
and began building another camp nearby. When asked how he felt about the eviction and 
demolition of his camp, one member of the Roma group replied: “Nothing. I’ve been through 
this many times.” (Astier 2014). There are many differences between the rioters at Saint-Aignan 
and Grenoble and the people whose evictions were justified by those riots. The demonstrators 
and rioters were travellers, while those targeted for evictions and deportations were Roma. The 
French police’s treatment of both groups was the same, regardless. Riot police were deployed to 
handle the evictions of peaceful families. Despite the many incongruities in the French state’s 
treatment of the issue, it was able to justify illegal measures that targeted the Roma due to a 
rhetoric of security.  
 
Security and the Roma: French Rhetoric Concerning Roma Migrants 
 Following the demonstrations in Grenoble and Saint-Aignan, French officials began 
creating a discourse that securitized the Roma issue. I will be undertaking a discourse analysis of 
President Sarkozy’s speeches about the demonstrations and the Roma in order to show that these 
were instances of securitization. Specifically, I will examine Sarkozy’s speech in Grenoble, his 
declaration on security during a meeting with the Council of Ministers and his speech during the 
inauguration of a new prefect in Grenoble. In order to examine these examples of security 
discourse and evaluate them as instances of securitization, I will be relying on a theoretical 
framework informed by the Copenhagen School of Security Studies. According to the academics 
in the field of Security Studies, securitization takes place through two stages. The first stage 
involves the presentation of an issue as an existential threat. The second stage takes place when 
the public accepts that the situation necessitates emergency measures as the only viable solution 
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(Barbulescu 2012, 280). These two stages of securitization took place in the summer of 2010 in 
France. I will also argue that this resulted in a reconstitution of identities due to the negotiation 
of membership – in terms of both French membership and European citizenship – through the 
exclusion of the Other.  
 In the weeks following the rioting in Grenoble and Saint-Aignan, President Sarkozy 
made a series of speeches concerning the events and France’s Roma population. These 
statements cumulatively shaped the ways in which the events were understood by the French 
public. In doing so, the speeches also securitized the Roma. In the days after the rioting, Sarkozy 
visited Grenoble in order to make a speech about order and security. In his speech, Sarkozy 
denounces the actions of the rioters, stating that they endangered police lives and threatened the 
safety of the public. He first focuses on the specifics concerning the incidents, but then turns to 
general comments about the causes of the violence and the shortcomings of France’s 
immigration policy (Barbulescu 2012, 282; Parker 2012, 477). The second speech took place on 
July 21, 2010 during a meeting of the Council of Ministers. Sarkozy presented a declaration on 
security, in which he expresses the need to address crime in France. Following the ministerial 
meeting, Sarkozy placed his focus on French Travellers and Roma immigrants from Eastern 
Europe, connecting them to the issue of crime. The third instance of securitization took place on 
July 30, 2010, when Sarkozy gave a speech in Grenoble at the inauguration of a new prefect. 
Each of these are examples of security discourse which contributed to the securitization of the 
Roma in France. The arguments presented in these speeches were centered around three major 




 Throughout his speeches, Sarkozy makes several points about the Roma’s excessive 
mobility, which frames them as outsiders and intruders. During his speech in Grenoble, Sarkozy 
introduces the issue of immigration. He states that the recent violence was related to “50 years of 
migration not being sufficiently controlled” and then calls for a fight against illegal immigration 
(Barbulescu 2012, 282). Migration was not an issue at the forefront of the events at Grenoble. By 
bringing the issue of immigration into the conversation, Sarkozy effectively begins to frame the 
group of people who is to be held responsible for the violence and societal issues related to it – 
namely, the Roma. By stating that there has been a lack of sufficient control over immigration, 
Sarkozy argues that something has entered France which should not have been allowed in. These 
intruders are the Roma, who allegedly bring crime and squalor with them. Sarkozy frames the 
Roma as unwelcome guests who do not belong in France. He portrays them as outsiders who 
pose a threat to France. This strategy reifies the boundaries between the French and the Roma by 
framing the Roma as Others through securitization.  
Within the securitization discourse undertaken by French officials, there is a trend in 
which the Roma are presented as abusing the rights afforded them through EU citizenship. 
According to Directive 2004/38/EC of the European Parliament, EU citizens can exercise their 
right to move freely between member states of the EU. For stays over three months, migrants 
must be able to prove that they have sufficient resources so that they will not be a burden to the 
social services of the member state in which they choose to reside (European Parliament 2017). 
However, according to the securitization discourse, the Roma commit an “abuse of the freedom 
of movement,” (Barbulescu 2012, 287). The migration of Roma persons is not inherently illegal, 
as Sarkozy’s speech implies. However, the Roma are presented as undermining the rights of true 
European citizens when they express their mobility. There is a certain ambiguity in the notion of 
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European identity. Parker notes that citizens are supposed to be “settled national citizens” but at 
the same time “mobile entrepreneurs,” (Parker 2012, 485). The mobility of workers, students and 
tourists is seen as a fundamental part of the project of a united Europe. The European Single 
Market depends on the dismantling of borders and impediments to movement. But the mobility 
of the Roma is presented as excessive. Moreover, they are threatening to the values of French 
society. 
 The Roma are viewed as a security problem because they are presented as a criminal 
group that poses a threat to public safety. In the Grenoble speech, Sarkozy declares a “war 
against drug dealers” as well as traffickers and delinquents (Barbulescu 2012, 282; Parker 2012, 
477). There was no mention of drugs or trafficking in any of the accounts of Duquenet’s death or 
the demonstrations. Sarkozy’s allusion to these issues indicates that he is making larger claims 
about the kinds of people who are a threat to French society. He argues that drug dealers and 
traffickers are not welcome in France because they do not abide by French values. Since the 
Roma are heavily associated with crime according to public perception, they are included in this 
group of outsiders. During his security declaration, Sarkozy calls for a “relentless fight against 
crime” and “a true war against traffickers and criminals” (Barbulescu 2012, 282). The issue is 
expanded further than Grenoble and Saint Aignan, as Sarkozy makes an argument about a 
general societal issue, rather than a couple of local events. It also further emphasizes the 
correlation between the Roma and crime. At the inauguration speech, Sarkozy characterizes 
Roma camps as “savage” and as “outlaw zones that we cannot tolerate in France,” (Barbulescu 
2012, 284). The Roma are collectively associated with crime and immoral behavior. This is in 




 During the ministerial meeting, Sarkozy appointed two new prefects in the regions 
involved in the demonstrations. These newly appointed prefects were Eric le Douaron in Isere 
and Christian Lambert in Seine Saint-Denis. Both were former police officers. The appointment 
of police officers as prefects creates the perception of insecurity in those areas (Barbulescu 2012, 
282-283). It also contributes to the perception of the problem as being as issue of policing. This 
effectively erases other potential explanations of the disruptions, such as the socio-economic 
status of immigrant groups – especially those as marginalized as the Roma – which can 
contribute to criminal activity and poverty. In a press release which took place after the 
ministerial meeting, Sarkozy placed his focus on French Travellers and Roma immigrants from 
Eastern Europe. He characterized the Roma as living in an “outlaw situation” (situation non 
droit) in illegal camps and of being “sources of illicit traffic, of profoundly undignified living 
conditions, of exploitation of children for begging, prostitution or crime” (Barbulescu 2012, 
283). This list of grievances frames the Roma as a group that poses a serious threat to public 
order and security. 
In Sarkozy’s security rhetoric, the Roma present an existential threat to French society. 
During the security declaration, it becomes evident that Sarkozy aims to approach the question of 
security as a national issue with far-reaching consequences for all members of French society. 
He declares that crime must be addressed on a national level during his speech at the ministerial 
meeting (Barbulescu 2012, 282). The events that occurred at the local level in Grenoble and 
Saint Aignan are transformed into a national issue with dire consequences. He also frames the 
Roma as a problem group which poses a threat to French society. During the inauguration 
speech, the Roma threat is also heavily emphasized. This existential threat is presented as the 
destruction of values that are inherent to French society. Sarkozy states that during the rioting in 
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Grenoble, “certain values were destroyed; we must propose measures adequate to the situation,” 
(Barbulescu 2012, 284). Because the Roma are associated with crime, they are considered 
outsiders since they allegedly do not adhere to the values of French society. The existential threat 
is evident in the rhetoric of security and Othering. French society and French values are at risk of 
fundamental change and destruction because of the presence of the Roma. 
In order to deal with the existential threat, Sarkozy proposes exceptional measures which 
are justified through Othering. After he presents the Roma as a threat to France, Sarkozy 
introduces the exceptional measures that will act as a solution. According to Sarkozy, the 
measures are “adequate to the situation,” (Barbulescu 2012, 284). Therefore, the evictions and 
deportations of Roma immigrants are justifiable because of the serious nature of the issue. He 
advocates for the dismantling and evacuation of illegal camps which are presented as the locus of 
criminal activity. He also calls for the removal of foreign nationals who allegedly abuse their 
European citizenship and the EU legislations regarding freedom of movement (Barbulescu 2012, 
283). In other words, Sarkozy argues for deporting Roma migrants despite their right as EU 
citizens to cross borders freely. This solution calls for a state of exception for the Roma since it 
disregards EU legislation. Sarkozy also implies that the Roma collectively abuse the rights of EU 
citizens, although the support for this claim is not mentioned. Evidently, the Roma are excluded 
from France, as well as the EU, since they are not afforded the rights of other EU citizens. The 
solution to the existential threat is presented as the removal of the Roma from France, which 
repositions the borders between the French and the Roma, as well as that between the European 
and the Other.   
 The securitization discourse presented by Sarkozy in his speeches was particularly 
effective because it used the rhetoric of the point of no return. The idea that the Roma threat was 
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an existential problem was emphasized through this rhetoric. During the inauguration speech at 
Grenoble, Sarkozy states that France is at a “critical moment beyond which there will be no ‘us’ 
anymore,” (Barbulescu 2012, 285). He also argues that the values of French society are “values 
that are on the verge of extinction,” (Barbulescu 2012, 285). This way of framing the issue gives 
it a sense of urgency while reestablishing the presence of a real threat. It also emphasizes an “Us-
Them” divide, which is indicative of the Othering taking place through the securitization 
discourse. This sentiment is underlined by the statement that “France cannot gather all the trash 
in the world,” (Barbulescu 2012, 285). The aim of this sentence is to equate the Roma with 
garbage that does not belong in France. The exclusionary sentiment and the blatant prejudice 
against the Roma are clear in this statement. Sarkozy also argues that criminal activity is a direct 
attack on French values. He states that “Current crime doesn’t come from a precarious situation, 
as I often hear: it is the result of a profound contempt towards the fundamental values of our 
society,” (Barbulescu 2012, 285). In this statement, Sarkozy erases the possibility of considering 
the socio-economic causes of crime. Instead, he essentializes the Roma, stating that their values 
are not only different from those of French society, but that they are actively attacking French 
values. This invocation of a threat to societal values is the existential threat that allows for 
exceptional measures to take place.  
 Sarkozy’s speech is also particularly effective as an instance of securitization because it 
emphasizes the existential threat in such a way that it inhibits any form of contrary opinion or 
discussion. Sarkozy delegitimizes any opposing opinion by making the claim that all of French 
society is under threat. Moreover, he emphasizes the need to act as soon as possible, rather than 
debate the issue. He states that 
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“The war that I decided to start against traffickers, against hoodlums […] 
exceeds the context of this government, of a majority or of a party. And I 
am sure that in all political formations we can find men and women of 
good will that are determined to react and to bring their support in this 
action of the government of the Republic,” (Barbulescu 2012, 285).  
In this context, criticism of the government’s policies only hinders the solution to the existential 
threat. Democratic debate is presented as an unnecessary and time-wasting endeavor. This 
rhetoric is meant to show that Roma camps and criminality are critical issues that the public 
should react to with a common position. The threat to French values is presented as being all-
encompassing; it has nothing to do with political affiliations or socio-economic positions. 
Everyone who is a member of French society is under threat. Therefore, everyone should 
unquestioningly subscribe to Sarkozy’s plans to evict and deport the Roma in the interest of 
keeping French values alive.   
 
Results of Securitization 
 The second stage of securitization, as outlined above, takes place when the public accepts 
that emergency measures are necessary in order to deal with the existential threat. As can be seen 
above, Sarkozy calls for the support of all French citizens in his approach to dealing with the 
“Roma issue.” Certain ministers, including Brice Hortefeux claimed that the government’s 
policies had the support of the public (Parker 2012, 478; Schofield 2010). However, others have 
noted that the “the zeal with which the government reported its process of camp clearances and 
deportations caused palpable unease for many within France,” (Parker 2012, 478). Jean-Pierre 
Grand, a member of Sarkozy’s UMP party, remarked on the similarities between targeting Roma 
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camps and the arrests of French Jews and Gypsies during World War II (BBC News, 2010). In 
spite of the possible lack of full public support, the French government was able to implement 
policies that directly targeted the Roma for eviction and expulsion.  
 A series of confidential administrative circulars dated the 24th of June and the 5th and 9th 
of August of 2010 were produced in order to implement the dismantling of illegal camps. The 
circulars were leaked and showed that the intentional targeting of Roma as an ethnic group was 
taking place (Parker 2012, 478). According to the administrative circular from the 5th of August 
regarding the evacuation of illicit camps, “it is the responsibility of prefects from each 
department to proceed, on the basis of the situations on the 21st and 23rd of July, in the direction 
of a systematic approach to dismantle illicit camps, giving priority to those of the Roma,” 
(Barbulescu 2012, 287-288). It is evident that French authorities explicitly targeted the Roma for 
evictions from camps.  
Although expulsion on account of public policy, public security, or public health can 
occur under the EU directive concerning freedom of movement, such expulsions must take place 
on a case by case basis (European Parliament 2017). The collective targeting and expelling of 
Roma migrants violates these safeguards. The targeting of the Roma population was made 
possible due to the securitization discourse which framed them as foreigners threatening the 
French way of life. French officials argued that outsiders should be excluded from France and 
should not be allowed the rights of full EU citizens. Therefore, in this case, the securitization 
resulted in the Othering of the Roma by excluding them from French society and EU citizenship. 
This Othering was consequential for the Roma as it provided justifications for the dismantling of 
their camps, as well as the collective deportations of Roma migrants.  
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 The reality of the evictions and expulsions is indicative of the efficacy of the security 
discourse in reframing the ways in which identities are understood in France and Europe as a 
whole. The securitization of the Roma reshaped the borders around those allowed to be part of 
French society and those who are excluded from it. In the process, it served to redefine the 
identities of both the French and the Roma. Throughout his discourse, Sarkozy made statements 
about a group of people allegedly threatening the essence of French society and the republican 
order. By doing so, he draws lines around the insiders and the outsiders of France. The Othering 
present in the security rhetoric is meant to justify the evictions and deportations that took place in 
the summer of 2010. However, the discourse has greater implications for the perception and 
meaning of identities in France. Because of the link that was drawn between them and the riots, 
the Roma are associated with crime and immoral behavior. They are equated with “the trash of 
the world,” (Barbulescu 2012, 285). They are essentialized as criminals while the socio-
economic causes of their situation are ignored. This results in the perpetuation of prejudices 
against the Roma. The framing of the Roma as a social threat adds an aspect of security to the 
already negative perception of the Roma.  
The French are also redefined through this discursive relationship. French society is 
characterized by its values, which are worthy of the greatest amount of protection. These values 
are opposed to the “illicit traffic, […] profoundly undignified living conditions, […] exploitation 
of children for begging, prostitution or crime” that are associated with the Roma even though 
these are socio-economic issues and not indicative of the group’s inherent character (Barbulescu 
2012, 283). The republican order is also seen as highly valued and in need of protection, despite 
the calls for ending democratic debate on the subject. Through the securitization discourse, 
French identity is shaped by being contrasted against a group that is presented as essentially non-
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French. Despite the contradictions inherent in this discourse, the securitization of the Roma 
reshapes understandings of French and Roma identities.  
 The securitization of the Roma also brings up questions about who is truly considered 
European and who can benefit from the rights of EU citizens. The argument that the Roma abuse 
the right to freedom of movement implies that they are not full citizens of the EU. Their 
membership to the EU is called into question since they are not portrayed as deserving the 
mobility that is afforded to other EU citizens. In other words, the mobility of the Roma is not 
valued in the same ways as that of other individuals. They act as a surplus immigrant population 
as they are not needed or wanted in their host states. It has been argued that freedom of 
movement is the foundation of EU citizenship (van Baar 2014, 6; Verstraete 2010). Therefore, 
the rejection of the Roma’s freedom of movement indicates that their EU citizenship is not 
valued to the same extent as that of other nationals. This in turn shows that the Roma are in 
practice considered non-European. By implying a distinction between the Roma and the rest of 
Europe, the securitization of the Roma contributes to a process of Othering and subsequently 





Chapter 5: Conclusions 
            This thesis has been concerned with studying the relationship between two ideas – that of 
European-ness and Roma identity. Through close analyses of the discourses that shape both these 
forms of identity, certain conclusions about them have been made. The first and perhaps most 
important to the overarching argument of this thesis is that identity is a construction which is 
impacted and shaped by various forms of discourse. Therefore, these identities are constantly 
created and re-created through their representations. This is strongly evidenced by an 
examination of Roma identity and the ways in which it is presented in various discourses. A 
discussion of the scholarly and political discourses that define the Roma has shown that the 
project of defining the Roma is full of discrepancies. Scholarly, national and supranational 
discourses fail to present a clear picture of the Roma and the rules regarding membership into 
this group. Instead, the Roma are often presented as a homogeneous group, despite numerous 
discrepancies in the various definitions of “Roma.” The representation of the Roma as 
homogenous is further challenged by accounts of Roma self-identification, which do not match 
up with outsider identification. I have also pointed out that the construction of European-ness 
heavily relies on the Self-Other dichotomy. Due to the need for an Other against which to frame 
itself, Europe is consistently involved in the exclusion of certain groups. The process of 
establishing who is or is not considered “European” is a continuous project that inevitably 
involves discourse. Because the Roma are a group that has been subjected to both inclusion to 
and exclusion from Europe, they are a constitutive Other that is useful for examining the Self-
Other dichotomy and the framing of European-ness. 
Using security as a theoretical framework has been an effective tool for connecting these 
ideas with one another and showing the ways in which they function in contemporary processes. 
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I examine the case of the securitization and subsequent deportations that occurred in France in 
2010. The language of security was used in order to frame the Roma as outsiders who were 
exceptions to the freedom of movement allowed to all citizens of the EU. By making the case 
that the Roma were outsiders that posed a threat to French society, the French government took 
part in redefining the distinction between the French and the Roma. By claiming that the Roma 
are unlike other Europeans, they justified the deportations that restricted the Roma’s freedom of 
movement. Securitization is a contemporary form of Othering that establishes the Self-Other 
relationship between Europe and its constitutive Others. The process of securitizing a group 
creates an outsider against which the majority group frames its own identity. This reifies 
difference between the two groups and influences understandings of each identity.  
Throughout this examination, it has become clear that Othering has consequences for the 
Roma that extend further than the construction of their identity in the context of Europe. Political 
elites frame the Roma as outsiders and non-Europeans in order to justify extreme measures of 
controlling them. In France and other EU member-states, officials are able to deport or otherwise 
restrict the mobility of the Roma. The Roma regularly face evictions and expulsions. They are 
also treated as second-class citizens across Europe. They are prone to poorer education and lower 
employment rates due to systemic anti-Roma discrimination. Despite most of the Roma’s 
citizenships to the EU and its member-states, the discourse that frames the Roma as outsiders has 
diminished the effectiveness of these citizenships. The Roma are often not offered the same 
protections, rights and privileges that are afforded to other European citizens. Discourse 
constitutes both Roma and European identities. But the process of forming these identities and 
the outcomes of this process result in very tangible and real consequences for the Roma, as they 
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are further entrenched in the role of outsiders. In other words, the reification of difference allows 
for the further mistreatment of Europe’s minorities.  
 
The Roma as Insiders and Outsiders 
 The Roma are an effective example of the Self-Other relationship because they are both 
insiders and outsiders in Europe. The Roma are insiders because they have been members of 
European societies over a long period of time. Records show that the Roma were noted in 
European documents during the 12th century (Crowe 1994, xi). They have inhabited the 
geospatial area now known as Europe for hundreds of years. Over this span of time, the Roma 
have become part of the societies they inhabit despite claims that they fail to integrate. 
Historically, the Roma were an important labor force, at times providing skilled wage labor, at 
others being placed into systems of forced labor. Today, the Roma live among their fellow 
Europeans. Just as their fellow Europeans, the Roma move across borders in the hopes of finding 
work and security for themselves and their families.  
 Despite their long history in Europe and their membership within European societies, the 
Roma are also outsiders there. Historically, they have been relegated to the lowest social ranks 
and their movement and access to land have been restricted. At the worst, they were used as 
slave labor in the 16th through the 18th centuries (Crowe 1994). Recently, the “Roma problem” 
has been framed as a question of integration. However, the Roma are continuously marginalized 
and exoticized at the local, national and supranational levels. This shows that the Roma are 
constantly placed in the position of outsider despite their history in Europe and their lack of 
another homeland.  
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This dual position allows the Roma to fulfil the role of constitutive Other over time as 
they remain an excluded group while also becoming an intrinsic part of the societies that they 
help define. The role of both insider and outsider is a precarious one, but it is useful in the aim of 
reconstituting identities. The Roma are framed as outsiders in various political discourses. But 
they are kept close enough that it is easy to call them into the public’s imagination when the need 
arises. In this way, the Roma fulfill the role of necessary Other to Europe. Europe’s otherwise 
fragile coherence and sense of unity are made stronger through the exclusion of certain groups. 
People can conceptualize themselves as Europeans if they can visualize the kinds of people who 
are not European – or at least not fully European. The Othering that takes place through 
securitization makes this possible today.  
 
The Treatment of Others  
 The goal of this thesis has been to show how Othering takes place in Europe in order to 
create and recreate the idea of European-ness. The Roma have been an effective case in 
exploring this argument for the reasons explored above. However, the Self-Other relationship 
that exists between the Roma and Europe can also be seen in the treatment of Europe’s other 
Others. As has already been noted, Europe has historically been defined in relation to an 
outsider; “Europe” has meaning because it is not Africa or Asia. It has also been defined in 
relation to specific groups of people who were understood to be non-European. The Roma are 
not the only Others to Europe. Today’s Others include immigrants, refugees and religious 
groups. All of these groups are regularly excluded in various ways. One interesting similarity, 
however, is that they are all prone to securitization – just as in the case of the Roma. Evidently, 
the use of securitization rhetoric is a popular form of contemporary Othering.  
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 The work of this thesis is useful in examining the reasons for the treatment of certain 
groups. The marginalized, minoritized, exoticized and generally excluded are all part of the Self-
Other relationship. Those who frame these groups as outsiders provide many justifications for 
their actions. They claim that the given group does not belong in their society, that they are too 
foreign, that they are somehow less human than the general population. But it should be noted 
that all of these claims are relational. They create and define the relationship between the given 
group and the majority. In the case of the Roma and the various Others found in Europe, their 
exclusion helps shape the notion of European-ness. Therefore, it is necessary to look past the 
claims of security and outside threats in order to understand the reasons for framing certain 
groups as outsiders, as this is closely connected to identity politics.  
 This discussion of the Self-Other dichotomy between the Roma and Europe helps clarify 
the reasons for the ill treatment of various minorities in Europe. Migration and security issues are 
often presented as problems of vital importance; they are existential issues as they threaten the 
safety and inherent values of a society. These issues claim all of the public’s attention and they 
necessitate drastic measures. However, an examination of the discourse of these claims shows 
that what is really at stake is the identity of the threatened society and that this rhetoric can often 
be used to obscure other issues. Recreating European-ness in this way can result in disastrous 
consequences for the outsider groups. The work done in this thesis allows for a more detailed 
understanding of the ways in which identities are constituted in Europe. By doing so, it also 
allows for a reconceptualization of the treatment of minorities in Europe and can therefore serve 
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